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Abstract 
 
Localization and decentralization are frequently presented as good for women. 
However, the reality is not so clear-cut. Local government is the tier that is closest to 
people but relationships, structures and processes of local governance can both limit 
the space for women’s participation and the policy potential for addressing gender 
issues. The experience of democratic reform in South Africa is invariably held up as 
an example of good practice in advancing gender equity in governance. Critically 
drawing on this experience, the article points up some of the paradoxes for women 
and gender equity of decentralisation strategies and governance at the local level.
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Decentralising Government and De-centering Gender: Lessons from Local 
Government Reform in South Africa 
 
Introduction 
Localisation and decentralisation are often presented as good for women, particularly 
when they are linked to democratisation. However, local government can often prove 
to be an ambiguous arena for state society relations. It is that part of the state closest 
to people and as such has the potential to engage more effectively with women and to 
address their interests. Nevertheless, however circumscribed, competing interests 
remain clustered around power and resources at local government level in ways that 
exclude women. Informal systems and relationships cut across local governance, 
limiting the space for women’s participation and for taking up issues important to 
them. When the impulse for decentralisation is efficiency rather than equity, gender 
interests are less likely to be addressed. These conclusions are drawn from a study of 
local government reform and decentralisation in South Africa following the first 
national non-racial democratic elections in 1994. 
 
Since South Africa’s transition to a liberal democracy, government efforts to advance 
gender equity have been held up as a beacon of good practice across the world. 
However, experience of democratic reform has demonstrated that local government 
poses particular challenges for advancing gender equity in policy and increasing 
women’s representation in politics. It was at local level that women in civil society 
organised most vigorously and effectively during certain moments of opportunity 
during the anti-apartheid struggle. However, this has been difficult to sustain in the 
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post-apartheid era and the article seeks to explain why. Two sets of issues are 
particularly highlighted. The first relates to the entrenchment of local relationships 
and power structures, particularly traditional authorities and their role in the conduct 
of local governance. The second relates to the nature of decentralisation in South 
Africa and the fact that policies addressing women’s gender interests, developed in 
the early 1990s on the assumption of a strongly egalitarian and interventionist state, 
are at odds with the neo-liberal framework that has characterised decentralisation 
policy in South Africa since the late 1990s. Both sets of issues are closely related to a 
development agenda that is being pursued largely at the expense of an engendered 
local democracy. Given the careful attention paid to women’s representation in terms 
of national structures and policy, this article considers why the egalitarian and 
participatory model adopted at national level has not taken root in local governance.   
On the contrary, local government seems to be more responsive to the interests of 
conservative groups. Second, it is characterised by the model of a contracting state 
that is more likely to pursue partnership with private firms and developers than with 
citizens, and this at the expense of a thoroughly democratic form of decentralisation. 
 
Problems of engendering local governance lie not only with the state. Women’s 
participation and representation in organisations within society is by no means 
guaranteed. While women in community and local level organisations mobilised 
vigorously and effectively at certain opportune moments during the anti-apartheid 
struggle, this has been difficult to sustain in the post-apartheid era. This is despite the 
fact that women are galvanised by the delivery of local services important to them and 
other issues falling within the remit of local government. Here problems of joining up 
and scaling up diverse activities at community level pertain, as does the tendency of 
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broad-scale social movements to capitalise on women’s organisation without 
addressing their gender interests. Critically drawing on the South African experience, 
the analysis points to some of the paradoxes for women of decentralisation policies 
and how contrary to conventional thinking, women face greater obstacles to political 
engagement at the local than the national level.  
 
Decentralisation and Engendering Democracy  
From the mid-1980s countries throughout the world began experimenting with some 
form of decentralisation, early examples in sub-Saharan Africa being Ghana, Nigeria, 
Tanzania and Zambia.1 By the mid-1990s, 80 per cent of countries, all with very 
different political dispensations, were engaged in some form of decentralisation2 
Whether understood in an administrative sense,3 as a policy framework ‘in which 
public goods and services are provided primarily through the revealed preferences of 
individuals by market mechanisms’4 or in relation to an explicit democratising 
function5 decentralisation has become one of the core components of political 
conditionality in international development cooperation.6 While the decentralisation 
agenda has been heavily donor-driven, disenchantment with bloated central 
bureaucracies and kleptocratic national states has not been confined to international 
development agencies. Democrats have also turned to decentralisation as a favoured 
as a mechanism for improving accountability and transparency and state society 
relations.7 In other words, strengthening local government has been justified both as a 
means of making government more efficient and effective (weak decentralisation) and 
as a way of increasing democratic participation (strong decentralisation).  
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Decentralisation nevertheless has its sceptics. Heller points out that there are no a 
priori reasons why more localized forms of governance are necessarily democratic 
and suggests that under some contexts decentralised authority can be quite 
pernicious.8 The most obvious example of this is indirect rule under colonialism, 
when local despots in the service of an imperial power exercised decentralized 
authority. This is pertinent to the contemporary South African situation where it can 
be argued that traditional authorities are providing local government on the cheap on 
behalf of central government in a system that shares some parallels with indirect rule. 
Localised forms of governance have the potential for elite capture, can tend towards 
pork-barrel politics and offer no improvement on central government when 
bureaucratic control is unreasonable. More immediately, when decentralisation is 
accompanied by policies promoting the marketization of public services this leads to 
problems of affordability for low-income people and in turn local government is often 
deprived of the human or financial resources to cope with the demands made upon it 
by decentralisation.9 In the event, it has been argued that there is little empirical 
evidence to support or refute the efficacy of decentralisation.10  
 
As with decentralisation, the term governance can be used in either a technical or 
political sense. At its simplest it refers to the relationship between government and 
citizen but there are two ways in which the concept is used to describe this 
relationship. The first understands governance as sound administration and 
management of public resources, weak governance if you will. The second and 
broader definition sees governance not so much as a set of functions as an expression 
of power between state and civil society, understood as two sides of the same coin, 
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implying a much stronger form of governance. Stoker11 argues that the ‘essence of 
governance is the interactive relationship between and within government and non-
governmental forces’. Both perspectives inform the arguments of those who see local 
governance as important arena for advancing women’s participation and 
representation. For example, the International Union of Local Authorities12 has 
argued in their position paper on women in local government that: 
From a gender perspective local government is the closest and is the most 
accessible level of government to women. Local governments traditionally 
provide services utilized by individual households such as electricity, waste 
disposal, public transport, water, schools, health clinics and other social 
services. The decisions of local governments therefore have a direct impact on 
the private lives of women, because they are traditionally responsible for 
providing for and caring for the family and the home in many countries. 
Women also have important and unique contributions to make to the 
development and appropriate management of these services. They must be 
fully part of the local democratic system and have full access to the decision 
making structure. Until the interests of women have been represented at the 
local level, the system is not fully democratic. 
The reasons why local politics are thought to be easier for women are well rehearsed. 
Evertzen sites then as follows:13  
 
… because eligibility criteria for the local level are less stringent, and local 
government is the closest to the women’s sphere of life, and easier to combine 
with rearing children. It can be the first level that women can break into and as 
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such it may serve as a springboard to national politics, by developing 
capacities and gaining experiences. Likewise local politics can be more 
interesting to women as they are well acquainted with their community, being 
the major users of space and services in the local community (water, 
electricity, waste disposal, health clinics, and other social services). They also 
participate actively in organisations in their neighbourhood, and it’s easier to 
involve these organisations in formal political decision making at the local 
level.  
These same factors have been marshalled in support of decentralisation as a route 
towards enhancing gender equity. For example, there are expectations that 
decentralisation will make service delivery more gender sensitive through the 
proximity of locally elected representatives to their constituents. The latter in turn is 
thought to ensure better understanding of the gender dimensions of service 
requirements and community needs. Efficiency arguments also point to the efficacy of 
women’s community level engagement, where their contribution is seen as an asset in 
ensuring effective local planning and management.  
 
While the ideal of democratic decentralisation does hold out promise to women, ideal 
conditions rarely prevail. Manor has pointed out that the limited evidence available on 
the impact of democratic decentralisation on women ‘offers only modest 
encouragement’ as prejudices against women are often more strongly held at local 
than at higher levels.14  One of the reasons for the disappointment of local 
government for women is that it is particularly responsive to informal institutions, 
systems and relations of power, rather than formal rules and procedures. This serves 
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to advantage men because women’s historical exclusion from local government 
means that they do not have access to the same kinds of networks and are less 
experienced and adept than men at developing them. Thus one of the reasons 
advanced as to why local government is less productive for advancing women’s rights 
than is often expected is because the informal institutions in which local governments 
are often embedded are hostile to women. This is demonstrated and confirmed by the 
experience of South Africa particularly in relation to traditional authority systems, 
which remain deeply antithetical towards women and yet are centrally implicated in 
the exercise of local governance.   
 
Local Government Reform in South Africa 
The end of apartheid changed the face of South African local government irrevocably. 
However, democratising sub-national tiers of government was bound to be awkward 
given South Africa’s history as a country divided spatially along racial and ethnic 
lines and the fact that these divisions were most obviously and keenly felt at local 
level.  At the time of the negotiated settlement in South Africa the attention of all 
parties was firmly focused on control of the central state and the nature of provincial 
government so that local government was at first neglected. Chapter 10 of the Interim 
Constitution dealt with local government and as Spitz (2000:183) has observed, ‘[I]ts 
most striking characteristic was its sparseness’, doing little more than creating a loose 
framework for how it was to operate. At the central level a fierce battle ensued 
between the forces of reaction that hoped for a federalist or consociational solution 
and the African Nation Congress, which wanted majority rule in a strong central state, 
concentrating on securing national jurisdiction and rationalising the multiple 
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provincial and Bantustan administrations into a single South African system of sub-
national government.15 Local government thus became a residual category in relation 
to which the African National Congress made a number of initial concessions. For 
example, elements of consociational government, having been denied nationally, were 
ensured at local level, meaning that significant decisions could not be taken without 
the consensus of minority residents.16 Although this was later overturned, as 
Robinson has observed, local government became the site on which existing privilege 
was most robustly defended.17
 
The Local Government Transition Act (Act 209 of 1993) defined a three-stage 
process for the restructuring of local government. First, elections were held for 
transitional local councils in 1995/6,18 allowing for some continuity of delivery until 
the second phase of local government reform was in place. Second, the establishment 
of the Municipal Demarcation Board followed in 1998 in order to redraw municipal 
boundaries across the country.19 Although presented as a technical exercise, the 
demarcation process was also an intensely political one. Concerned in part with 
overcoming the legacies of apartheid planning and racially skewed resource 
distribution, it brought the ruling party into contestation with traditional leaders who 
saw the process as disregarding the boundaries of traditional authority areas in a 
process that reduced the number of municipalities from 843 to 284.20 The third stage 
of fully-fledged democratic local government followed the local elections in 2000. By 
the time of the second local government elections in 2000 the autonomy of local 
government was ensured and could only be withdrawn at the risk of infuriating the 
thousands of ANC local councillors who had vested interests in protecting the powers 
of local government, a good proportion of whom were women. 
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 Nevertheless, the setting up of structures and procedures proved to be complicated, 
given the absence of any effective local government in South Africa outside of the 
former white areas during the apartheid era.  In urban areas the Black Local 
Authorities set up in the late 1970s were not sustainable, having lost legitimacy and 
virtually collapsed. In rural areas local government functions remained largely in the 
hands of traditional leaders who worked within and alongside apartheid structures, in 
a system not dissimilar to indirect rule inherited from the colonial era. Through this 
traditional authorities had amassed considerable local level power and they were keen 
not to see this dissipate under a new dispensation. The Local Government Transition 
Act provided little guidance on how local government councils in rural areas should 
be constituted and it was left to provincial government to decide on the form rural 
local government should take. The result was that traditional leaders were able to 
entrench their powers over a relatively lengthy period of transition and this was to 
bode ill for women’s representation and influence over the longer term.21  
  
Women and Local Government in South Africa 
Shortly after coming to power in 1994 the ruling African National Congress adopted a 
non-sexist constitution and a strategy for setting in place South Africa’s celebrated 
national machinery for advancing gender equality. 22  This placed South Africa at the 
cutting edge of experience in state initiated gender policies and structures.23 As a 
result South Africa is heralded internationally as having one of the most progressive 
policy frameworks for improving the condition and representation of women.24 
Nevertheless, South Africa’s structures and processes for achieving gender equity still 
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merit critical scrutiny particularly when viewed from the bottom up.25 During the 
early transitional period government strategies in relation to women’s representation 
in politics were sorely neglectful of the local level.26 One factor inhibiting women 
from taking their rightful place in a process of democratic consolidation has been a 
preoccupation with technocratic structures and procedures for engendering 
governance. According to Manicom this has served to depoliticise the goal of a non-
sexist democracy: 
There is no question that this ‘gender offensive’ has resulted in a profound 
shift in the norms, structures, and practices of national and supranational 
institutions of governance. But there are questions about the application of 
‘gender’ in governance …. Systematic ‘engendering’ risks standing in for 
feminist/gender activism.27  
Moreover, as transition loomed activists turned to electoral strategies to advance the 
position of women and inevitably began focusing at the national level.28  
 
Along with others involved in the negotiation process, women also woke up late to 
the strategic importance of the local level for advancing gender equity because the 
broader effort during the negotiated transition was at the national and provincial 
levels. The movement of women towards securing the national project also left local 
leadership depleted. Indeed, it was only the repeated lobbying on the part of one small 
Cape Town based advocacy organisation, the Gender Advocacy Programme, which 
led the Commission on Gender Equality to eventually take up the importance of 
women’s representation in local government. Following the poor showing of women 
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in the 1995/6 elections the Gender Advocacy Programme began to organise around 
local government representation.29  In the run up to the 2000 local government 
elections the Commission for Gender Equality also embarked on a campaign to 
increase the representation of women in local government and to ensure that 
government became more responsive to women’s interests and demands.  
 
In the former goal at least they were successful. Following the 1995/96 local 
government elections only 19 per cent of councillors were women, resulting in 
heavily male dominated local councils. However, after the local government elections 
in 2000 elections women constituted 28.2 per cent of all local government 
councillors.30 One crucial explanatory factor was that by the time of the second local 
government elections proportional representation was matched by a ward system on a 
fifty-fifty basis at local level,31 changing the gender balance of local councillors.32 
The Municipal Structures Act of 1998, which included guidelines stating that ‘every 
party must seek to ensure that 50 per cent of the candidates on the party list are 
women and that women and men candidates are evenly distributed through the list’, 
largely promoted this.33 Legislation also provided that there should be equal 
representation between women and men on the Ward Committees, something fought 
for by the Gender Advocacy Programme among others and rightly considered to be a 
significant victory at the time. While these were guidelines rather than statutory 
requirement the African National Congress nevertheless increased its quota of women 
to 46 per cent at local level.34 Significantly, a number of the increased proportion of 
women local councillors were elected as ward candidates and did not only enter local 
government through the proportional representation system, showing that women 
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political representatives are coming to be accepted at local level in South Africa 
although performance across the country was patchy.  
 
The deficiencies of the ward system for women were particularly apparent in the 
statistics for KwaZulu-Natal where traditional authorities remain strong. Here, while 
34.3 per cent of seats for women were achieved through the party list women 
occupied only 12 per cent of ward seats.35 Although the proportional representation 
system works in favour of women, a mature democracy should be able to field elected 
women candidates at ward level as well. After all, being accountable to a generic 
constituency of women ‘out there’ is different from being directly accountable to 
actual women constituents on the ground. In this the local level is in advance of other 
tiers of government in terms of ensuring women’s real political presence. The ward 
committees are also proving to be a key route for civil society participation, alongside 
considerable increases in women’s representation. A critical question is the extent to 
which this translates into a system of engendered democratic decentralisation in 
which gender interests are addressed. 
 
Weak and Strong Decentralisation in South Africa 
 
In 1998 the Local Government White Paper advanced the concept of ‘developmental 
local government’ and determined that municipalities pursue integrated development 
planning in a context of inter-sectoral partnerships that required the active 
involvement of communities, alongside other vested interest groups, through both 
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public and private investment.36 1 From the outset the African National Congress saw 
developmental local government as a vehicle for national development. Local 
government was given constitutional protection alongside a constitutional claim to the 
powers necessary to provide services for its residents, including fiscal capability. 
While provincial government is financed mainly through transfers from the centre, 
local government is responsible for raising over 90 per cent of its own revenue.  
 
Local governments have a number of sources of revenue, the main ones being rates on 
property and surcharges on fees for services provided by or on behalf of the 
municipality. Other sources of revenue are allowed but explicitly exclude income tax, 
value-added tax, general sales tax and customs duties. 37  Although decentralisation 
has meant that local government is responsible for some basic service delivery, this is 
also the responsibility of both provincial and local governments, with local 
government as the junior partner in the intergovernmental fiscal system.38  However, 
there is considerable variation between at one end of the spectrum the large 
metropolitan municipalities that achieve a level of financial autonomy and at the 
other, small rural councils with scant fiscal capacity and a heavy dependence on 
national government transfers through a system known as the ‘equitable share’. This 
has to temper the view that the relative financial autonomy of local government is an 
indicator of strong decentralisation. National government became enchanted with the 
managerial potential of decentralisation, giving rise to a plethora of technocratic 
procedures that were institutionalised without sufficiently sustained attention being 
paid to local level representation and participation. Moreover, as McDonald and Pape 
have argued, decentralisation was accompanied by cutbacks in central government 
                                                 
1 Policy frameworks predicated upon the constitutional principles of inter-governmental cooperation 
include infrastructural support programmes, planning guidelines, service partnerships and a range of 
local economic development initiatives. 
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allocation to local authorities, rendering the market logic more pressing.39 If 
developmental local government simply means central government shifting 
responsibility for service delivery to the local level through a series of unfunded 
mandates, decentralisation in South Africa can be characterised as weak.  
 
Following the April 2004 national elections the government signalled a shift towards 
increased pro-poor spending given that the macro-economy had now been stabilised. 
However, limited resources and expanded responsibilities of local government for 
service delivery have made cost recovery almost inevitable. The impact on many poor 
urban residents has been devastating. Cut-offs have been employed both in respect of 
individual households that cannot afford services and as a more widespread strategy 
to punish whole communities for non-payment. In some cases this has even extended 
to service providers ripping out infrastructure.40 Under such circumstances not only 
are decentralisation strategies potentially dangerous for local governments, with their 
constitutional responsibility for the social and economic development of communities, 
but also for communities and citizens.  
 
There is another side to developmental local government that points towards 
democratic decentralisation, that being constitutional commitment to popular 
participation in local government, including women as a distinct constituency. Local 
authorities are required to undertake medium-term Integrated Development Plans that 
are linked to municipal responsibilities and budgets and that should reflect priorities 
identified by communities. There have been problems related to implementation. For 
example, those who have been around longer often exclude newcomers to an area and 
despite initial energy during the first round both officials and community 
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representatives subsequently tired in what is a time-consuming exercise. 41 Even in an 
assessment of the first Integrated Development Plans, the city of Johannesburg stated 
that ‘incorporating residents’ contributions to policy, programmes and projects is far 
from satisfactory’. 42 Another problem with integrated development planning is that 
municipalities find it difficult to incorporate the multiple and often contradictory 
views that citizens express. 
 
Early experiences show that gender issues tended to get lost as multiple local 
priorities were aggregated upwards into a plan. For this not to happen requires 
something of a ‘technical fix’ in that capacity within local authorities needs to be 
raised so that officials understand the gender dimensions of local government 
responsibilities and services and are encouraged by incentive structures that 
encourage good practice on their part. However, while the imperative of participatory 
planning is now legally inscribed in the legislative code of local development in South 
Africa, 43 in a country where strong central control is retained, for the technical 
dimensions of decentralisation to feed democratic decentralisation requires not only 
responsive government but strong commitment on the part of organised civil society 
to women’s involvement and impact on local development processes and outcomes.44 
This is difficult when civil society organisations are increasingly perceived as partners 
in the development process and consequently as responsible for sharing in the cost of 
service delivery. Research conducted in Cato Manor in Durban45 and Greater Soweto, 
Johannesburg suggests that this cost is largely born by women in households and 
communities. 46
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Democratising and Engendering Decentralisation  
South Africa has two of the key ingredients for successful democratic 
decentralisation. First, decentralisation within the context of a weak state is unlikely 
to succeed and South Africa has a strong national state and robust inter-governmental 
coordination. Second, decentralisation works best when it encounters a vibrant and 
well-organised civil society that can identify and engage effectively with policy 
makers, which South Africa can also boast. Despite this, national government in 
South Africa is not unusual in tending to see political control as a zero-sum game, 
with more power to the local level being equated with less for the centre. This has 
been exacerbated more recently by a tendency towards centralised control within the 
ruling African National Congress and increasingly vociferous social movements that 
in the wake of transition have regrouped and found their confidence, voice and 
constituencies. Trade unions such as the South African Municipal Workers Union and 
the Anti-privatisation Forum have challenged the government’s managerial and 
technocratic approach to decentralisation that falls short of genuine democratisation 
and stretches to the limit the resources of those who cannot afford service charges or 
who survive without services only with difficulty.  
 
Women’s advocacy in relation to local government in South Africa has been very 
influenced by debates on the politics of collective consumption.47 This has manifested 
itself in a preference for organised struggles around housing and living conditions, 
infrastructure and services, hardly surprising given that this approach influenced 
much of the early gender and development literature focused on local and urban 
development more generally and reflected the real concerns of many disadvantaged 
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women.48 This influence can be seen in early49 and more recent thinking50 about 
gender and local development in South Africa. Here, given the obviously superior 
investment in infrastructure and services in former white middle class areas and the 
equally obvious need to extend delivery by investing in former black townships and 
informal settlements, it was to be expected that infrastructure and services would be a 
critical focus in the post-apartheid era. By continuing to press for affordable housing, 
sanitation, waste collection and water and electricity connections, contemporary civic 
organisations explicitly inserted a distributive agenda into local politics, to some 
effect.51  
 
According to official government statistics the proportion of households that have 
access to clean water has increased from 60 per cent in 1996 to 85 per cent in 2001.52 
Electricity connections over the same have period increased from 32 per cent to 70 
per cent. Between 1994 and 2003 nearly two million housing subsidies were approved 
and almost half a million houses built in the apartheid era were transferred to their 
occupants through a discount benefit scheme. Almost half of all subsidies approved 
were granted to women.53 Nevertheless, some local authorities have met the 
challenges of poverty reduction and service delivery better than others and there are 
significant differences between rural and urban areas, as well as across different 
services and different levels of service. Moreover, although the number of serviced 
households has increased across the board, access to some services and levels of 
services has declined in absolute terms. This is usually in cities with the fastest 
growth in population and in the number of households, where municipalities have 
found it difficult to keep pace with need.54  
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 In terms of the impact on women, in its review of the first ten years of democracy the 
South African Government had to admit that ‘Housing, land redistribution and other 
services … show significant improvements in gender bias, although the majority still 
go to male-headed households’.55 Moreover, managerial decentralisation has put local 
government in the unique position of what Samson calls ‘dumping on women’.56  
 
The implications of inadequate services for women are considerable. When a 
household’s services are cut off because of non-payment it is women of the household 
who have to cope with the consequences. When services are shared in common, for 
example communal taps or toilets, it is usually women who take responsibility for 
their maintenance and cleaning. Indeed, in Johannesburg it was found that struggles 
over shared services proved to be the single most important factor in propelling 
people out of accommodation in backyard shacks in formal township houses and into 
the more difficult physical conditions of informal settlements.57 Moreover, research in 
a Durban informal settlement suggests that the importance of formal housing in well-
serviced areas as a means towards alleviating the burden of domestic chores cannot be 
over-estimated.58  
 
Among the strategies for engaging local government on services have been the 
campaigns of the Anti-Privatization Forum such as Operation Khanyisa whereby 
electricity once disconnected is then illegally reconnected; and Operation Vulamanzi, 
which involved the breaking of prepaid water meters, allowing water to flow freely. 
The Forum does not advocate illegal activities or non-payment for services but 
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recognizes them as an inevitable consequence of their members simply being unable 
to afford them. Moreover, non-payment of services is a hardy perennial within the 
repertoire of South African collective action, dating back to the heady days of anti-
apartheid opposition in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, cut-offs of water and 
electricity constitutes a draconian response for a democracy that prides itself on its 
human rights record and one that is particularly hard on women, inevitably impacting 
on their role in social reproduction. A debate is ensuing currently in South Africa 
about the extent to which cut-offs have actually been employed. However, what is 
abundantly clear is that women constitute the bulk of the membership of the Anti-
Privatization Forum.  
 
From late 2002 the Anti-Privatization Forum saw its women members beginning to 
meet as women and they ran a number of workshops on gender issues. However, 
although the commitment remains among the female membership the momentum has 
been difficult to sustain. According to one Forum activist interviewed in relation to 
activities in Johannesburg, this is because ‘we have been caught up in other things as 
an organization, and as activists have been spread very thinly’. Others are less 
optimistic, arguing that the post-1994 social movements in South Africa tend to use 
women and have ‘very often relied on the mobilization of women on the basis of their 
practical needs – for example, for electricity, land and housing – but have rarely 
linked these to issues of the pernicious gender division of labour.’59  The major 
difference between local organization during the apartheid era and transition and the 
situation since is that in the earlier period there was the hope and expectation that 
women’s involvement and organization could be scaled up and that it would amount 
to something for women. This is no longer the case as Hassim has pointed out:60
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 One of the most notable changes in the landscape of the women’s movement 
in the post-1994 period was the fragmentation and stratification of women’s 
organizations in civil society. The political centre of the Women’s National 
Coalition did not survive as the layer of the top leadership of women’s 
organizations shifted into positions in the state and bureaucracy. The new 
stratifications which emerged reflected a disaggregation of the movement into 
a diversity of arenas, some of which - such as those closely tied to policy 
making processes - were strengthened by new approaches to civil society 
within the state, whereas other levels reverted to the more familiar 
community-based forms of organisations.  
 
Thus under apartheid women were successfully organised at the community level 
around issues important to them such as high rents and service charges but this has 
been less the case in what has become known as South Africa’s ‘first decade of 
freedom’. 
 
Moesoetsa confirms that women continue to be organised at community level and that 
they are animated by issues related to service delivery. 61 She paints a bleak picture of 
poverty and unemployment driving people into the confines of the home where they 
rely only on family support and reciprocity within the confines of small and trusted 
social networks. However, she points to important sites of collective action, such as 
church groups, savings clubs and burial societies62 and argues that they have helped 
in the face of what she characterises as a crisis of representation spanning both the 
political sphere, for example mistrust of political parties, as well as civil society, for 
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example disappointment in trade unions that are perceived to have let people down in 
the face of factory closures, unemployment and poverty. Under these conditions and 
arising out of mutual support activities Mosoetsa observes a stirring among women in 
response to inadequate service delivery or affordability issues related to water supply 
and electricity. For example, a new alliance was formed in 2000 in response to the 
installation of water metres in the township, leading to community marches and the 
disconnection of water metres when the metropolitan council refused their offer to 
pay £10 a month,63 which is what they said each household could afford. For 
Mosoetsa, this engagement with metropolitan government, largely on the part of 
women, points to a revitalised site of organisation and emerging citizenship. 
Nevertheless, women have a long way to go, not least in scaling up and asserting their 
agendas in broader organisations of civil society. 
 
One of the arenas through which women have sought to hold government to account 
and that offered a degree of promise was through a ‘watchdog’ role in relation to 
revenue and expenditure. Inspired by the experience of women in Australia, South 
Africa was one of the first countries to take gender budgeting seriously and during the 
1990s the Women’s Budget Initiative was established during the 1990s.64 Gender 
Responsive Budgets are mechanisms by which governments, in dialogue with other 
sectors, can integrate gender analysis into public expenditure policies and budgets. 
This does not imply a separate budget for women but rather the political will to 
disaggregate expenditure according to its differential impact on women and men.65 In 
South Africa as elsewhere, gender analysis of local government budgets is not as 
advanced as efforts at the national level. However, in the halcyon days of gender 
budgeting, women organising around local government issues in South Africa teamed 
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up with the Women’s Budget Initiative in their watchdog role.66  As Hassim has 
pointed out: 
 
The project had real possibilities to raise fundamental questions about 
spending priorities and to highlight the ways in which women were benefiting 
(or not) from particular policy approaches. However, within a few years the 
Ministry of Finance, which had initially embraced the Women’s Budget 
Initiative, downgraded the project and it is now virtually moribund at the 
national level.67
 
She is swift to point out that this conclusion should not be read as meaning that 
engaging the state is misguided but rather to consider how the state should be engaged 
and how to build a grassroots women’s movement that is sufficiently mobilised to 
support a critical engagement with the state. In the meantime she stresses the 
importance of consolidating the political gains made for women at the national level.  
 
If this strategy is to be paralleled at the local level then the issue of taxation is one that 
needs to be persistently pursued, not least on the grounds that as payers of rates and 
service charges, women have a right to make demands on local governments and to 
hold them accountable. Some progress has been made in South Africa towards raising 
awareness about the impact of local government revenue and expenditure on women. 
This has involved informing women about local government expenditures and 
revenues and advocating on resource allocations that promote gender equality.68 The 
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focus on local government budgets has had an interesting impact on gender budgeting 
itself, shifting the bias on expenditure towards greater concentration on how revenue 
is raised. Budlender has argued that not only are the revenue sources of local 
government more diverse than for national or provincial government - including 
alongside inter-governmental transfers, property taxes, licence fees, tariffs for services 
and user charges for basic services - but also they can have a particularly adverse 
affect on women. 69  This is the case, for example with user charges, which often 
become women’s responsibility within households. Coopoo notes in the case of South 
African local government that user charges account for over half of operating budget 
income, although as with all sources of revenue there are enormous differences 
between municipalities.70 If local authorities are primarily dependent on cost recovery 
as a revenue source then problems are likely to get worse rather than better for low-
income women.  
 
There are also more informal areas of local revenue collection that particularly affect 
low-income women. In urban areas there are licences and site fees for street traders, 
which Skinner notes in respect of women street traders in Durban, constitute a 
significant proportion of most traders’ incomes even if they seem low in absolute 
terms.71 Coopoo highlights the range of local taxes that poor women and men have to 
pay in rural areas, including in some parts of KwaZulu-Natal where a compulsory 
levy is paid to the king, often without understanding why or ever seeing any benefit. 
In urban areas in South Africa, women are more likely to be seen as taxpayers and to 
see themselves as such and here the role of civil society organisations such as the 
Gender Advocacy Programme and women’s initiatives such as the Women’s Budget 
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Initiative have been important. In rural areas the challenge is greater. Customary law 
and traditional practice has not seen women as taxpayers in their own right and efforts 
on behalf of or by women to ensure that revenue streams are collected and spent 
efficiently, equitably and in gender sensitive ways proves to be that much more 
difficult.  
 
In evaluating whether localisation and decentralisation are good for women, the 
evidence is mixed. Clearly, the key route for civil society participation is through the 
ward committees and interestingly this is the forum that has seen considerably 
increases in women’s representation, particularly in urban areas. For example, a 
recent study of women’s involvement in local governance and development in an area 
based development project in Cato Manor, an informal settlement in Durban, 
demonstrates not only the importance of women in civil society organisation but also 
their exercise of voice on their own account: 
Women leaders were particularly adept at negotiating this organisational 
terrain [competition for development resources within a political volatile area] 
and gained enhanced credence with the CMDA [Cato Manor Development 
Association responsible for development and delivery at the time]. Their 
legitimacy among supporters derived from a long history of involvement in 
land invasions, community organisation and progressive politics. Not averse to 
carrying weapons themselves, they were as strident as any male leader in the 
area. In the rank and file of organisational life, women were at the heart of the 
informal networks that characterised the squatter invasions in the late 1980s 
and 1990s.72
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Moreover, through the ward committees, the integrated planning process and in 
negotiations with the Cato Manor Development Association, women undoubtedly 
influenced planning outcomes in ways that spoke to their gender interests – for 
example in the nature of public space and amenities such as the situating of parks and 
street lighting. This is not to say that patronage and clientalism were absent or that the 
female leadership represented all women. Nevertheless, women at the community 
level did have an impact on issues that affected their lives.  
 
Importantly, however, the success that women had in Cato Manor would not have 
been possible without enabling legislation and policies at national level, which 
influenced and were implemented by the Cato Manor Development Association. This 
confirms that local politics and decentralisation policies are most likely to work in the 
context of a strong central state and robust inter-governmental coordination and the 
same can be said of women’s politics and engendering policy and practice at the local 
level. That said the reach of central government in South Africa is limited. Cato 
Manor is a vibrant urban settlement in a metropolitan centre that is relatively well 
resourced both financially and in human resource terms and that is closely linked to 
African National Congress state and party structures. The same cannot be said of 
remote and even not so remote rural areas. It is important, therefore, to consider in 
more detail the experience of rural local governance and decentralisation for women 
and here it is impossible to escape the role and impact of traditional authorities. 
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Women, Rural Local Governance and the Long Shadow of Tradition 
Important in understanding rural local government is that the institutional reach of the 
post-apartheid state was limited by the legacy of apartheid policies. In its recent 
publication Towards a Ten Year Review, the South African Government stated that 
‘the needs of local government are most critical, with the majority of municipalities 
not having the capacity … to perform their delivery functions’.73 This points to the 
importance of traditional authorities at the local level. Administratively they are seen 
as indispensable to developmental local government in the rural areas because under 
apartheid rural local government functions in African areas lay largely in the hands of 
traditional leaders and few alternatives are yet in place. As such they provide local 
government on the cheap. Politically their perceived importance for delivering rural 
constituencies to the African National Congress makes them difficult to alienate. 
Continuing with the status quo has meant that central government has not had to take 
on traditional leaders who having amassed for themselves considerable local power 
and who have been resilient in their opposition to any local government reform that 
stood to undermine their influence. As hereditary rather than democratically elected 
leaders, government legislation insists that traditional authorities work together with 
democratically elected bodies within the principles of the Constitution, while 
transforming themselves to become more democratic.  
 
However, representatives of chieftaincy have shown themselves prepared to stop at 
nothing short of constitutional protection of their customary rights and 
responsibilities.74 Between the first and second local government elections, in 1995/6 
and 2000 respectively, they succeeded in delaying the announcement of the election 
date three times until they extracted an undertaking from President Thabo Mbeki to 
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act on proposals to preserve their powers and functions in the new local government 
structures.75 Mbeki did not give into their demand for 50 per cent representation on 
elected local councils because this would have irked those within the African National 
Congress and opposition parties such as the Democratic Alliance, who believed that 
hereditary leaders should not be allowed to hold a democratically elected government 
to ransom. Nevertheless, he did increase their participation in local councils from ten 
to 20 per cent, despite the implications for local democracy, as well as the tensions 
this created between constitutional commitments towards gender equity and 
discrimination against women on the part of traditional structures and patterns of 
governance.  
 
Representatives of women and traditional leaders first came into conflict during the 
constitution-making period when some traditional leaders opposed the principle of 
gender equity. In the event the constitution validated both gender equality and cultural 
autonomy, ‘while placing equality as the ‘trump’ criterion in cases where both came 
into conflict’.76  However, while women’s organisations have continued to challenge 
chieftaincy they are often urban based and such opposition is more difficult for rural 
women who are customarily denied participation in traditional male-dominated 
decision-making structures and processes. Their well-being also rests with traditional 
leaders in very material ways. Customary law, which was upheld under apartheid, 
discriminates against women who could not own land or property in their own right 
and who lost any such rights on the death of their husbands. This was on a principle of 
male primogeniture that required that property be passed on to the nearest male 
relative. The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld this principle as recently as 200077 
even though under the new Constitution principles of gender equity are supposed to 
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prevail over the exercise of customary law. Traditional authorities also control access 
to communal land, to which women have restricted access, with most traditional 
leaders continuing to refuse to allocate land to women.78
 
The influence of traditional leaders has most recently been seen in the passing of the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA) in 2004. This Act 
validates the role of chieftaincy in local government and clarifies the position of 
traditional councils that must now operate within and alongside other local 
government structures. Section Three of the Act states that ‘traditional communities’ 
must establish these councils, which in turn must comprise ‘traditional leaders and 
members of the traditional community selected by the principal traditional leader 
concerned in terms of custom’. Where the old tribal authorities exist, established in 
terms of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, they will simply be converted into 
traditional councils. This significantly entrenches the authority of traditional leaders 
and means in effect that legislation introduced in the 21st Century will give perpetual 
life to a system of ‘indirect rule’ dating back to the colonial era.79  
 
The involvement of traditional authorities in developmental local government 
constitutes an administrative approach to decentralisation, albeit one that has the 
added advantage of no alienating potential political opponents. For example, being 
added to existing traditional councils and tribal courts are new government sponsored 
traditional development centres, dubbed ‘traditional’ because they are set up under the 
aegis of local chieftaincies and in coordination with traditional structures of 
governance. Some of these are already underway and are functioning as one-stop 
shops, serving as pension payout points, satellite offices for the Department of Home 
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Affairs, sites for mobile clinics, providers of HIV/AIDS awareness services and small 
business development advice. At the launch of the Mpumuza Traditional 
Development Centre, in KwaZulu-Natal the Provincial Traditional Affairs Member of 
the Executive Committee Inkosi Nyanga Ngubane said that the traditional 
development centres represented a shift in the way traditional communities related to 
local government and a transformation of local governance structures so that they 
were ‘more accessible to a greater number of people in the traditional authority 
areas’.80  
 
While taking information, communication and services to people in deep rural areas is 
undoubtedly a good thing and of potential benefit to women, it is ironic that primarily 
male non-elected appointees dominate the level of government closest to the people. 
Indeed, the elevation of hereditary chieftainship to a privileged and protected position 
within local governance seriously compromises rural women’s access to and influence 
on local government. In the name of modernising if not democratising traditional 
structures, the Traditional Leadership Act insists that one third of the ‘traditional 
community’ must be women and that of this one third, 25 per cent have to be elected 
by the community. However, this is in a context where 40 per cent of council 
members are elected, the remaining 60 per cent comprising traditional leaders and 
members of the traditional community selected by elders in terms of custom.81 The 
Act states that all traditional councils must adhere to this within the space of four 
years but there are no clear provisions or safeguards as to how women should be 
elected and no sanctions if there is a failure to comply.  
 
 32
Nowhere has government failed women more than in relation to land and women’s 
rights over its allocation and use. Initially it was proposed that land remain a national 
government competence and did not devolve to local government, although 
legislation would cater for a variety of different forms of land and property rights. 
Traditional leaders ferociously opposed this and the proposed legislation was shelved 
until after the 1999 elections when in April 2001 the new Minister of Land Affairs, 
Thoko Didiza, announced the introduction of a land rights bill. The bill emphasised 
communities rather than individuals and reinforced the power of traditional leaders.  
The Communal Land Rights Act was finally passed in late 2003, stating that land 
administration functions and powers – including the power to own, administer 
allocate and register land rights – must be performed by ‘traditional councils’ where 
they exist (Section 22(2)). The Communal Land Rights Act needs to be viewed in 
conjunction with the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, which 
went through parliament at the same time, immediately preceding the April 2004 
national elections. Clearly winning over traditional leaders was perceived as a greater 
political imperative than upholding the liberal democratic principles of the 
Constitution. 
 
This legislation was dogged by controversy and was opposed, not least by women’s 
organisations. Given the inevitable negative impact on women of these two Acts in 
combination, there may be some weight to the argument that the joint effect of the 
bills is anti-constitutional. Despite speculation that women’s organisations may take 
the government to the Constitutional Court on this issue, this has not yet materialised. 
Rural women were consulted by organisations involved in land issues such as the 
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Programme for Land and Agricultural Studies and their views and position 
represented and the Commission on Gender Equality also highlighted women’s 
concerns. However, they are not been well organised beyond the community level. In 
terms of civil society organisations, historically the Rural Women’s Movement helped 
ensure that distributive issues such as access to and control over land have been kept 
at the forefront of rural women’s political agenda, for example in relation to the 
constitution-making process. However, as Hassim has argued, ‘by the time the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework and Communal Land Rights bills 
were introduced, the Rural Women’s Movement was a virtually defunct 
organisation’.82 Ultimately women’s influence in this arena has been scant and the 
issue of women’s land rights remains unresolved.83  
 
The situation of rural women stands in stark contrast to the scenario of local 
government envisaged by the Gender Advocacy Programme in its commentary on the 
White Paper on Local Government:  
Local Government is the level of government closest to the people. It has 
particular importance for women, because of its responsibility for the delivery 
of goods and services that impact directly on the necessities of social 
reproduction, a sphere in which women have disproportionate responsibility. 
Its direct interface with the community puts Local Government in a unique 
position to understand the contextual dynamics that shape and regulate 
women’s lives. Through its location Local Government has the potential to 
contribute to greater gender equity.84
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On the contrary, to the insult of a desultory performance in ensuring rural women’s 
representation in local government has been added the injury of reducing their 
influence on the institutions that stand between them and access to critical resources 
such as land. Women’s access to resources remains elusive and is prevented above all 
by that level of government that is ‘closest to the people’. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Local government is the tier of government closest to civil society and as such really 
does hold opportunities for locally organised women. However, the co-location of 
government and civil society organisations at the local level can lead to ambiguous 
outcomes, with access to resources and decision-making being retained by existing 
power holders at the expense of the advancement of women’s participation. In South 
Africa, the intersection of the formal organisations of local government with socially 
embedded institutions, such as patterns of male dominance in collective action and 
customary practices by traditional authorities, have a negative impact on women’s 
prospects for democracy. Worse, these informal institutions appear to becoming 
increasingly entrenched in the formal organisation of local government and in law. 
This stands to undermine the hard-won rights of citizens and especially women who 
are prejudiced by practices and procedures of local governance in all quarters and 
now additionally by legislation. The extent to which local government and 
decentralisation are embedded in asymmetrical social relations and informal 
institutional practice, helps explain why local governance rarely proves to be a magic 
bullet for increasing women’s access to and presence in government as well as their 
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influence over it. Efforts towards the institutionalisation of gender in South Africa 
were made at the same time as the impact of neo-liberal policies was deepening in 
South Africa. The extension of services to historically disadvantaged populations 
came with a price tag in the form of cost recovery and women especially have acutely 
felt its social impact. It is at local level that the carbuncles of any political system are 
most apparent and in South Africa it is women who feel them most painfully.  
 
South African women so far do not have as secure a footing in local government 
structures as in other tiers of government. It could be argued that the vacuum left by 
the movement of a substantial number of women’s leaders into national and 
provincial government since 1994 has been necessary and indeed, there have been 
considerable pay-offs from this participation in terms of enabling legislation and 
policies. However, this now needs to mature into greater congruence between higher 
and lower spheres of government. Moreover, it is also at the local level that women 
can often organise most effectively. Their involvement in movements opposed to 
privatisation and cost recovery in service delivery is testimony to this. What appears 
to be missing is the space, ability or leadership for women to organise against 
decentralisation policies where they adversely affect their gender interests. Structures 
and processes do exist and can be taken advantage of by women’s and gendered 
organisations wishing to work alongside or with local government and these are 
constitutionally protected. Women taking effective advantage of these opportunities 
appear a long way off.  
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In sum, engendering democratic decentralisation on a number of factors, not least the 
nature of macro-economic policy in South Africa and how this articulates with issues 
of access and affordability, which affect all low-income people but particularly 
women and notably rural women. In part it depends on whether central government 
and the African National Congress with its resounding majority following the 2004 
national elections, remains open and responsive to challenge from civil society and 
whether civil society in turn is able to represent women and promote gender justice. 
At present, Manor’s assessment in relation to India that decentralisation ‘offers only 
modest encouragement’ to women appears as much the case for South Africa.85 As 
such, decentralisation and local government remain a real litmus test of South 
Africa’s ability to engender its new democracy.  
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